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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
Patricia Norlie-Lazorko committed suicide in July 1993, 
allegedly as a consequence of her untreated mental illness. 
Her husband, Jonathan Lazorko, brought suit in state 
court against Dr. David Nicklin, Patricia's doctor; University 
City Family Medicine, Nicklin's employer; Pennsylvania 
Hospital; the Institute of Pennsylvania; and U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., the health maintenance or ganization 
(HMO) administering Lazorko's health benefits. After a 
series of removals of the case to the U.S. District Court and 
remands to state court, Lazorko appeals the dismissal of 
his direct claims against U.S. Healthcar e and the District 
Court's award of sanctions against him for including two 
purportedly frivolous allegations in his complaint. U.S. 
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Healthcare cross-appeals the District Court's remand to 
state court of the vicarious liability claims against it. 
 
Following our recent decision in In r e U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), 1 we will affirm the 
remand to state court of the vicarious liability claims 
against U.S. Healthcare. We will, however, reverse the 
judgment of the District Court, dismissing the dir ect claims 
against U.S. Healthcare (Count I of the Complaint), and we 
will remand these claims to the District Court for remand 
to the state court. As for sanctions, Lazorko's attorney 
appealed only the interim decision sanctioning him, not the 
subsequent award to U.S. Healthcare of a specified amount 
of attorney's fees. We will ther efore dismiss the appeal of 




Norlie-Lazorko suffered from depr ession and 
schizophrenia. In late 1992, she attempted suicide and was 
hospitalized for six months. She was dischar ged from the 
hospital in June 1993 but again began contemplating 
suicide. Although she asked to be rehospitalized, Dr. 
Nicklin denied her request. On July 4, 1993, Norlie-Lazorko 
committed suicide. 
 
Following his wife's death, Jonathan Lazorko, as 
administrator of her estate, brought suit in Pennsylvania 
state court. Lazorko alleged as to U.S. Healthcar e that 
under state law it was directly and vicariously liable for his 
wife's death because the HMO imposed financial 
disincentives on Dr. Nicklin that discouraged him from 
recommending her for additional treatment. 
 
Based on this claim, U.S. Healthcare removed the case to 
federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1446(b). U.S. Healthcare argued 
that the denial of the hospitalization request was 
completely preempted by ERISA under S 502(a)(1)(B), which 
gives a member of an ERISA plan an exclusive federal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In re U.S. Healthcare was decided after the District Court's opinions 
in 
this case. Hence, the District Court did not have that decision available 
to it. 
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remedy for claims alleging the denial of benefits guaranteed 
by that plan. Lazorko moved to remand the case to state 
court. The District Court rejected Lazorko's motion, 
construing his direct liability claims as being for the 
improper denial of benefits, and thus completely preempted 
under ERISA. Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., et al., No. 95- 
CV-6151, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 1995) (Lazorko I). 
In a subsequent decision, the District Court dismissed the 
claims that were preempted by ERISA's civil remedy and 
remanded the rest of the case to state court. Lazorko v. 
Pennsylvania Hosp., et al., No. 95-CV-6151, slip op. at 2-3 
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 1996) (Lazorko II). 
 
On this first remand, the state court dismissed four 
counts of Lazorko's complaint. Three other counts, which 
alleged intentional misrepresentation, fraud, and violation 
of the state consumer protection law, wer e stricken without 
prejudice to amending. Lazorko did amend, but he left 
intact his central contention that U.S. Healthcar e's 
financial penalties interfered with Dr . Nicklin's professional 
judgment, causing Norlie-Lazorko's death. 
 
U.S. Healthcare removed the case to federal court a 
second time.2 In response, Lazorko moved again for a 
remand. Again, however, the District Court denied the 
remand motion, concluding as it had previously that 
Lazorko's direct negligence claims against U.S. Healthcare 
for denial of hospital benefits were completely preempted by 
ERISA's S 502(a)(1)(B). The court did grant the motions to 
dismiss of the other defendants.3Lazorko v. Pennsylvania 
Hosp., et al., CA No. 96-4658, slip op. at 8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
28, 1997) (Lazorko III). 
 
Following the second removal to federal court, Lazorko 
amended his complaint twice more. Although he added new 
facts, he did not change his central contention. Mor eover, 
rather than add a new claim, based on ERISA, to his 
existing claims of direct and vicarious liability, Lazorko 
instead moved to strike U.S. Healthcare's ERISA defenses, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. This time, the case was assigned to a dif ferent district judge. 
 
3. The other defendants are not parties to this appeal since Lazorko has 
not appealed the dismissal of the claims against them. 
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asserting that U.S. Healthcare had not shown that his 
health plan qualified as an ERISA plan. U.S. Healthcare 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that, because his 
state law claims related to an ERISA plan, they were 
superseded by ERISA's express preemption clause, S 514(a), 
29 U.S.C. S 1144(a). 
 
The District Court denied Lazorko's motion to strike U.S. 
Healthcare's ERISA defenses, reasoning that, under the law 
of the case, earlier proceedings had established the 
existence of a plan. Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., et al., 
CA No. 96-4858, slip op. at 4-6 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1998) 
(Lazorko IV). The District Court then granted summary 
judgment for U.S. Healthcare on preemption grounds on all 
of Lazorko's direct liability claims against the HMO, 
including the claims in Counts II, III and IV for intentional 
misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of Pennsylvania's 
consumer protection law.4 The court remanded Lazorko's 
vicarious liability claims against U.S. Healthcar e, however, 
because they alleged medical malpractice, an ar ea of tort 
law traditionally regulated by the states, which did not 
implicate the regulation of employer plans and, thus, was 
outside the scope of ERISA's express pr eemption. 
 
U.S. Healthcare also moved to sanction Lazorko's 
attorney, alleging that he had failed to r easonably 
investigate several of the charges levied against U.S. 
Healthcare, including the allegations that the company 
issued sham benefit policies and that it intentionally denied 
patients treatment so as to maximize pr ofits. The District 
Court granted U.S. Healthcare's motion in a second June 
30, 1998, order, which struck the of fending allegations 
from the complaint and awarded the costs incurred to 
defend against the challenged allegations.5 On July 24 and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because Lazorko has not briefed or argued that his claims against 
U.S. Healthcare, contained in Counts II, III and IV, are directed at the 
quality, rather than the quantity, of benefits r eceived under his plan, 
we 
will affirm the dismissal of these counts. Our discussion in this opinion 
of the direct claims against U.S. Healthcar e will be in reference only to 
those claims alleged in Count I. 
 
5. The offending allegations appear in paragraphs 25 and 39 of the 
Complaint. The District Court did not err in striking these paragraphs. 
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29, Lazorko appealed both of the June 30 orders. U.S. 
Healthcare cross-appealed the remand to the state court of 
the vicarious liability claims against it. 
 
Following a hearing on the amount of sanctions, the 
District Court awarded U.S. Healthcare costs of $2,452.50 
in an order filed on August 3, 1998. Lazorko did not appeal 
this order. 
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court purportedly had removal jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1441(a) by virtue of ERISA's complete 
preemption provision, S 502(a)(1)(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(a)(1)(B), which satisfies the "arising under" 
requirement for federal question jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1331. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. General 
Motors Corp., 481 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1987). W e have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e review the District 
Court's decision to remand under S 1367(c)(3) for abuse of 
discretion, but have plenary review of the underlying basis 
for remand to the extent that question is a legal one. See In 
re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 160 (citing Englehardt v. 
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1351 n.4 (11th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 
Although the District Court relinquished jurisdiction over 
this case when it either dismissed or remanded all the 
claims before it, it still had jurisdiction to order sanctions. 
Moreover, a district court has jurisdiction to impose Rule 
11 sanctions on litigants and attorneys appearing before it 
even if the court is subsequently determined to have lacked 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The court had S 502(a) removal jurisdiction and, therefore, could rule on 
and strike them. We will affirm the District Court's determination that 
Lazorko's attorney failed to satisfy the "stop, think, investigate and 
research" rule before including these paragraphs in his Complaint. See 
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 838 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987). Because 
Lazorko's attorney had no basis to assert the claims in paragraphs 25 
and 39, the District Court was within its authority to strike them, as 
well as to impose sanctions. We will affir m the striking of paragraph 25. 
We need not affirm the striking of paragraph 39 because we are affirming 
the dismissal of Count III, of which paragraph 39 is a part. 
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subject matter jurisdiction over the claim in which the 
sanctionable conduct occurred. See W illy v. Coastal Corp., 
503 U.S. 131, 139 (1992); In re Jaritz Industries, Ltd., 151 
F.3d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1998) (relying on Willy). 
 
Concerning the award of sanctions, while we review a 
district court's decision to impose sanctions for abuse of 
discretion, we have plenary review of the question of our 
jurisdiction over the appeal of the award. See Shareholders 
v. Sound Radio, 109 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir . 1997). An 
appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that is 
untimely filed, including premature appeals. See Hindes v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 155 (3d Cir. 
1998). An award of sanctions is not a final order, and thus 
not appealable, until the district court deter mines the 
amount of the sanction. See Napier v. Thirty or More 
Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees or Officers, 855 
F.2d 1080, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988). The District Court did not 
make this determination until its subsequent order, filed on 
August 3, 1998. Consequently, plaintiff 's July 29 notice of 
appeal of the June 30 sanctions order was pr emature and 
untimely. 
 
Nor does the fact that the District Court subsequently 
entered its final order on the sanctions motion on August 
3, 1998, cure this premature appeal and make it timely. A 
premature appeal can be cured by a subsequent final order 
if the untimely appealed decision would otherwise 
constitute a final judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). 
Because Rule 11 sanctions awards are interlocutory in 
nature, this rule does not extend to them. See FirsTier 
Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 
275-76 (1991). Thus, we lack jurisdiction over the 
sanctions order because plaintiff 's counsel failed to timely 
appeal that order once it had become final. W e will, 
therefore, dismiss that portion of the appeal. 
 
III. The Direct Claims Against U.S. Healthcare 
 
A defendant may remove to federal court an action that 
a plaintiff originally files in state court if the federal court 
also has jurisdiction at the time of filing. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1441(c). Whether removal is proper is governed by the 
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"well-pleaded complaint" rule. If a federal question appears 
on the face of the plaintiff 's complaint, the defendant may 
remove the case to federal court. If, however , the defendant 
merely has a federal law defense, he may not r emove the 
case, although he may assert the federal defense in state 
court. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983); 
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 
(1908). 
 
One exception to this rule is for matters that Congr ess 
has so completely preempted that any civil complaint that 
falls within this category is necessarily federal in character. 
Complete preemption creates removal jurisdiction even 
though no federal question appears on the face of the 
plaintiff 's complaint. One example of complete preemption 
is a claim for denial of benefits under an ERISA plan. Such 
a claim comes under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, 
S 502(a)(1)(B). See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63- 
64. 
 
Complete preemption contrasts, however, with another 
form of preemption, substantive pr eemption, which 
displaces state law but does not, as a defense, confer 
federal question jurisdiction. ERISA also contains an 
express preemption provision, S 514(a), that creates 
substantive preemption by trumping "any and all State 
laws [that] . . . relate to" an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. 
S 1144(a). Unlike the scope of S 502(a)(1)(B), which is 
jurisdictional and creates a basis for r emoval to federal 
court, S 514(a) merely governs the law that will apply to 
state law claims, regardless of whether the case is brought 
in state or federal court. 
 
Much of the District Court's discussion in Lazorko IV 
centered on the scope of S 514(a). W e do not need, however, 
to review those conclusions because our intervening 
decision in In re U.S. Healthcare  convinces us that 
Lazorko's direct claims against U.S. Healthcar e are not 
completely preempted. These direct claims, as they are 
presently pled, challenge the soundness of a medical 
decision by a health care provider rather than the 
administration of benefits under an ERISA plan. Thus, 
Lazorko does not seek a remedy for the administrative 
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denial of a benefit under S 502(a)(1)(B). For that reason, the 
removal of Lazorko's action to the federal court on the basis 
of complete preemption was improper . 
 
This conclusion follows from our decision in In re U.S. 
Healthcare. There, the plaintif fs, like Lazorko, challenged 
U.S. Healthcare's financial incentive structure. They 
claimed it contributed to their newborn daughter's death 
because she was prematurely dischar ged from the hospital 
in order that the hospital might avoid monetary penalties. 
Thus, the infant was denied essential post-natal car e. See 
193 F.3d at 156. The plaintiffs br ought their suit against 
the HMO in New Jersey state court, alleging a variety of 
state law claims aimed at the influence which U.S. 
Healthcare's financial incentive system had on medical 
decisions. As in the case before us, U.S. Healthcare 
removed the case to federal court, claiming that the failure 
to provide adequate post-natal care constituted a denial of 
benefits that was completely preempted by ERISA. 
 
Relying on our earlier decision in Dukes v. U.S. 
Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995), we reasoned 
that the refusal to offer additional car e, whether couched in 
terms of direct or vicarious liability, could be a question of 
the quality of care provided. As such, it did not amount to 
a claim that benefits to which the plaintif fs were otherwise 
entitled had been denied by U.S. Healthcare when 
administering a plan. Instead, the claim concer ned 
decisions of treatment that were akin to claims for medical 
malpractice. See In re U.S. Healthcar e, 193 F.3d at 161-62, 
164. We had concluded in Dukes that a claim for vicarious 
liability against an HMO for a doctor's malpractice fell 
outside the scope of ERISA's complete preemption clause. 
In In re U.S. Healthcare, we extended that ruling to 
encompass claims that an HMO was directly liable for 
arranging inadequate care. In doing so, we r easoned that 
financial incentives that discouraged care did not deny plan 
benefits but instead affected the quality of the care 
provided. See id. at 162-63, 164. Thus, we held that 
decisions to deny a particular request in the course of 
providing treatment could be a claim about the quality -- 
and not the quantity -- of benefits provided. (In all but the 
details, Lazorko's claims against U.S. Healthcar e fall 
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squarely within this rubric. On appeal, Lazorko argues that 
his liability claims amount to ones of quality because U.S. 
Healthcare implicitly caused Dr. Nicklin to misdiagnose 
and/or mistreat the severity of Ms. Norlie-Lazorko's illness. 
Thus, such a claim does not fall within the complete 
preemption scope of S 502(a)(1)(B).6 
 
U.S. Healthcare counters with two basic ar guments, 
neither of which we find persuasive. First, it ar gues that Dr. 
Nicklin's refusal to hospitalize Patricia Norlie-Lazorko 
amounts to a denial of benefits because hospitalization is a 
benefit under Jonathan Lazorko's HMO plan. W e reject this 
characterization of the claim. Lazorko is not ar guing that 
his plan is supposed to permit hospitalizations for mental 
illness and that U.S. Healthcare refused his wife's request 
for guaranteed service. Instead, he is arguing that, when 
confronted with his wife's requests for additional treatment, 
Dr. Nicklin, influenced by U.S. Healthcar e's financial 
incentives that penalized a decision to grant additional 
hospitalizations, made the medical decision not to r eadmit 
her to the hospital. Because Lazorko's claim is one 
concerning the propriety of care rather than the 
administration of that care, the claim is not completely 
preempted. In other words, the claim her e is that the denial 
of Norlie-Lazorko's request for hospitalization occurred in 
the course of a treatment decision, not in the 
administration of the Lazorkos' plan generally. See In re 
U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 164. 
 
U.S. Healthcare's second contention is that, in light of 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Pegram v. Herdrich, 
120 S.Ct. 2143 (2000), subjecting an HMO to liability is 
improper because Pegram recognized the centrality of 
financial incentives to the operation of an HMO. Pegram, 
however, does not alter our analysis. In evaluating the 
question of the circumstances under which an HMO owes 
a fiduciary duty to the members of an ERISA plan, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In making this argument, however , Lazorko continues to hedge against 
the existence of a plan, on which he bases his ar gument that ERISA 
does not govern this case. As the District Court correctly noted, however, 
the record evidence supports the existence of a plan, as does the law of 
the case doctrine. See Lazorko IV, slip op. at 4-6. 
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Pegram court held that mixed eligibility decisions by an 
HMO (i.e., decisions involving not only the coverage of a 
particular treatment by the plan but the r easonable medical 
necessity for the treatment) are not fiduciary decisions 
under ERISA. The decision in question here, the need to 
hospitalize Patricia Norlie-Lazorko, appears to be just such 
a mixed eligibility decision and to the extent that the mixed 
decision implicates the quality of the care r eceived by 
Norlie-Lazorko, Pegram does not foreclose the direct claims 
against U.S. Healthcare. 
 
Before our decision in In re U.S. Healthcare, it was not 
clear whether the denial of a particular type of benefit, such 
as hospitalization, fell within S 502(a)(1)(B)'s narrow but 
exclusive scope. This ambiguity was articulated in Dukes: 
drawing the line between the denial of benefits under a 
plan and the provision of substandard car e is difficult. See 
Dukes, 57 F.3d at 358. In ruling on Lazorko's claims here, 
however, the District Court did not have the benefit of our 
further analysis in In re Healthcar e. We now conclude that 
Lazorko's claim, as it has been pled, falls on the standard 
of care, not the denial of benefits, side of the line. 
 
We note, moreover, that since our decision in In re U.S. 
Healthcare, our district courts have consistently applied its 
reasoning to determine whether it is the quality of care 
provided or the denial of a plan benefit that is implicated 
when treatment is refused. See, e.g., Tiemann v. U.S. 
Healthcare, 93 F.Supp.2d 585 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (classifying 
failure to diagnosis and treat disease pr operly as question 
of benefit quality not quantity); Berger v. Livengrin 
Foundation, 2000 WL 325957 (E.D. Pa. Mar . 27, 2000) 
(concluding that refusal to provide inpatient care was 
question of quality of treatment and not denial of benefit 
due under plan). 
 
Because we conclude that Lazorko's case is not subject to 
complete preemption, it follows that it was improperly 
removed from state court. We must therefore vacate the 
dismissal by the District Court of the direct claims in Count 
I of the Fourth Amended Complaint and remand those 
claims to the District Court for remand to state court. 
When the underlying federal subject matter jurisdiction 
upon which to remove a case from state court does not 
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exist, the entire case must be remanded. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1447(c). 
 
On remand, it will be for the state court to further 
determine whether a S 502 claim of denial of a benefit 
provided by his plan is lodged in the heart of Lazorko's 
direct claims in Count I. If such a claim should materialize, 
that claim will have to be removed once mor e to federal 
court. Moreover, on remand the state court will also have 
the task to determine to what extent, if any, Lazorko's 
claims against U.S. Healthcare are substantively preempted 
under S 514. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 355 ("When the 
doctrine of complete preemption does not apply, but the 
plaintiff 's state claim is arguably preempted under S 514(a), 
the district court, being without removal jurisdiction, 




Because Lazorko requests relief for the consequences of 
U.S. Healthcare's provision of inadequate services and not 
for the denial of benefits under his health car e plan, Count 
I of his Complaint was improperly removed to federal court. 
Consequently, we will vacate the District Court's dismissal 
of Lazorko's direct claims against U.S. Healthcare and 
remand Count I to the District Court for r emand to the 
state court for further proceedings. We will affirm the 
dismissal of the direct claims against U.S. Healthcare in 
Counts II, III and IV. On U.S. Healthcar e's cross-appeal, we 
will affirm the District Court's remand to the state court of 
the vicarious claims against U.S. Healthcare. Finally, we 
will affirm the District Court's dismissal of paragraph 25 of 
the Complaint. At the same time, we will dismiss Lazorko's 
appeal of the award of sanctions against his attorney 
because he failed to timely appeal the final sanctions order. 
Thus, we lack jurisdiction over the order . 
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